风萧萧_Frank

Will Xi Jinping make a bid for legacy? China’s leaders have watched Russia’s war in Ukraine and perhaps drawn sobering lessons about the difficulties of conquest. But the vast disparity in military capability between China and Taiwan means Beijing may be tempted to move if American backing for the island appears to weaken, or the economic costs of offensive action fall. For now a blockade seems more likely than invasion, though even that carries huge risks, including military intervention and economic retaliation by America and its allies.

The two nuclear-armed archenemies have recently been brought back from the brink after a deadly skirmish—but their underlying conflict remains unresolved. In April 2025 an attack in India that killed 26 tourists triggered the most serious crisis in years, with cross-border strikes and more than 50 deaths along the line of control in Kashmir before a ceasefire was declared. Field Marshal Asim Munir is tightening his grip on power in ­Pakistan, and India’s rapid economic growth is widening the conventional military gap. With a fifth of the world’s population between them, keeping the peace in 2026 is of no small importance. Two factors will make it harder. America, which often mediates between the two, has estranged India in a tariff war. And in their latest spat, India and Pakistan showed less restraint than in the past.

Russia’s casualties are now estimated to exceed America’s in the second world war. Its forces have seized just 1.3% of additional Ukrainian territory since December 2022. This arithmetic of attrition suggests that 2026 will bring either glacial progress, a conflict frozen from exhaustion, or some sort of deal. But two other scenarios are possible: a Ukrainian front-line or political collapse, aided by Kremlin subversion; or Russia’s economy buckling as aerial attacks shut down its oil industry. Either of the two would have massive consequences for Europe, and the world.

Will the fragile truce hold? Gaza lies in ruins, with tens of thousands dead. Israeli forces still control half of the territory, and Hamas has yet to disarm. Horrific though it would be, a resumption of war is not inconceivable. Both sides have already accused the other of violating the most recent ceasefire, negotiated in October. But if Mr Trump remains invested in his peace plan, and those involved co-operate, there is hope, too. If an international peacekeeping force materialises, rebuilding could finally begin at scale. Displaced Gazans would then be able to return to what remains of their homes. For now, though, the most probable outcome is grimly familiar: a divided territory, suffering Palestinians and a pause in the violence that endures—until it does not.

Decades-old tensions over ethnic grievances and eastern Congo’s mineral wealth threaten to explode into full-scale war. Under its dictator, Paul Kagame, Rwanda in 2025 armed, supplied and directed M23 rebels as they seized Goma, a major city in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and for good measure sent in its own troops, too. M23’s areas of operations in Congo roughly double Rwandan territory by proxy, and a thin agreement signed in the White House between Mr Kagame and Felix Tshisekedi, Congo’s president, did not include them. Ugandan troops have also stepped up their activities in Congo—acting as “security partners” to Congo’s weak government—because they are worried about M23, who fight their local allies. Gold is part of the draw. Rwanda, which has little domestically, has mysteriously become a major exporter. Also in the mix are oil, gas and minerals such as cobalt, critical for battery production.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) remain locked in fierce warfare. The paramilitary RSF controls much of Darfur and western Sudan, while the SAF holds the capital and eastern regions. Millions of civilians are on the run, and many are starving. The conflict, and Africa’s largest humanitarian crisis, is likely to persist, fuelled by support from Egypt, which backs the SAF, the UAE, which backs the RSF, and other regional powers (the UAE denies involvement). But should the two sides’ backers see reason, a deal could be possible—and potentially lucrative. For an ambitious would-be peacemaker like Donald Trump, Sudan offers both riches (gold, oil and a strategic coastline) and the opportunity to end what may be the world’s deadliest active conflict.

In its renewed focus on security in “our hemisphere”, the Trump administration has been massing forces off Venezuela, expanding military exercises and striking small boats that it claims are smuggling drugs. The ultimate goal may be to hasten the end of Nicolás Maduro’s regime, though how much force America is prepared to use is unclear. Air strikes are more likely than an amphibious invasion. Mr Trump may even deploy special forces if he sees a chance to capture or kill Mr Maduro. Venezuela’s president has no shortage of enemies. He recently escalated Venezuela’s century-old claim to two-thirds of the territory of neighbouring Guyana—the oil-rich Essequibo region. Despite orders from the International Court of Justice not to do so, Venezuela held illegal gubernatorial elections for “Guyana Esequiba” in May 2025, picking administrators for territory it doesn’t control. But now any move on Guyana by Venezuela would surely trigger a confrontation with America.